

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TECHNICAL TRAINING STRATEGY
FOR A TRANSFORMING ARMY

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Army is currently transforming at a breakneck pace to ensure it remains relevant and ready to meet the future threats and challenges of the new century. These monumental changes cut across the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, modernization, personnel and facilities). Quality training has and will always be a vital component of the Army's success. As the Soldier remains the centerpiece of the Army's formations, the Army must transform its training strategy to ensure that each Soldier is both tactically and technically proficient. Based on the historic changes associated with Army transformation, the Army is also revising its Non-commissioned Officer professional development program, but only has plans to modify its strategy as it pertains to tactical and leadership training. The Army must develop and implement a new technical training strategy to ensure that Soldiers remain technologically competent and can successfully function in the future force. It must, therefore, put as much effort and resources into training transformation as it does into the other elements of the DOTMLPF.

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TECHNICAL TRAINING STRATEGY FOR A TRANSFORMING ARMY

Capabilities associated with the tools of war will improve, and combat techniques will reflect these changes. But fundamental to the realization of any improvements in technology, techniques, operational concepts, or strategy will be the capacity of the Soldier to bear the hardships of combat and adapt to mission demands. Soldiers remain the centerpiece of our formations. Their collective proficiency and willingness to undergo the brutal test of wills that is combat remains the ultimate test of Army force readiness.

- FM 1-0, The Army, pg. 35

The Army's transformation cuts across all aspects of the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities). From significant structure changes, to more modular units, to complex personnel management changes like force stabilization, to aggressive equipment modernization changes like STRYKER and Future Combat System (FCS), to evolving doctrinal changes (network centric warfare), the Army is changing in every area simultaneously.

Based on the historic changes associated with Army transformation, the Army is making significant changes to its Non-commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), but only has plans to revise its strategy as it pertains to tactical and leadership training. The current model, which includes Basic Combat Training (BCT), Primary Leadership Development Program (PLDC), Basic Non-commissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Course (ANCOC), and the Sergeant's Major Academy, is undergoing a significant change of curriculum and training methodology based on Army transformation. This change, however, is not addressing required changes to its enlisted technical training strategy.

The initiative to significantly overhaul NCOES was born of the realization that because of the Army's transformation, the existing training model was inadequate - NCOES schools were still teaching skills based on the Cold War paradigm and not concentrating on the right tactical skills required of Soldiers now and in the future. In areas where the proper skills were being trained, they were being trained entirely too late in the Soldiers' career. The net result of this "transformation in training" will be more relevant tactical training given at the right time in a Soldier's career. The Army is not, however, planning similar changes to the technical training it provides to its enlisted force. Although the transformation to the future force involves constant injections of emerging technologies, the Army has not provided sufficient resources to transform its technical training. The Army must develop and implement a new training strategy to ensure that Soldiers remain technically competent and can successfully function in the future force.

THE ARMY IS TRANSFORMING

The Army is currently undergoing changes of historic proportion. This Army transformation is arguably the most aggressive and comprehensive makeover the Army has ever attempted in its long and dynamic history. The current transformation program had its origins with the vision of previous Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki. His vision was first articulated in October of 1999 when he addressed the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) conference and unveiled the Army's road ahead to the Objective Force. The intent of the Army transformation is to create an expeditionary-minded force capable of meeting the new threats and challenges of the 21st century. The force must be more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the full spectrum of military operations.¹

Army Chief of Staff (CSA), General Peter Schoomaker has taken General Shinseki's vision of transformation multiple steps forward and accepted an incredible amount of risk during a time of uncertain funding streams and high OPTEMPO to insure that Army transformation does not get delayed by the current "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT). In fact, he has used the current GWOT to accelerate his transformation initiatives. General Schoomaker's vision of Army transformation is not a grand divergence from his predecessor's; however, he has increased the pace and scope of it significantly. He has articulated the priorities of his vision for transformation as a package of 17 focus areas. These focus areas include: the Soldier; the bench; the Combat Training Centers; leader development and education; Army aviation; current to future force; the network; modularity; joint and expeditionary mindset; active component/reserve component balance; force stabilization; actionable intelligence, logistics; installations as flagships; authorities, responsibilities, and accountability; resource processes; and strategic communications.² General Schoomaker's initiatives and emphasis on rapid change are reflected in his writings on transformation:

The changes ahead are significant. But they are neither reckless nor revolutionary. On the contrary, they reflect years of Army study, experimentation, and experience. We have delayed this transformation repeatedly, fearing we could not afford such change in a time of turbulence and reduced resources. Now we realize that what we cannot afford is more delay.³

CURRENT TRAINING MODEL

Currently, the Army's training model selects Soldiers for training in conjunction with their selection for promotion. For example, a Soldier selected for promotion to Sergeant (SGT) is, at the same time, selected for the Primary Leader Development Course (PLDC); similarly, upon

selection to Staff Sergeant (SSG), the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) is selected to attend the BNCOC; and upon selection for Sergeant First Class, selected for the ANCOC. At each of these professional development courses, the Soldier receives institutional training on the tactical and leadership skills that will be required of him to successfully serve at the next level. This is not true for technical training, however. Technical skills are not currently taught in conjunction with PLDC. Therefore, a Soldier receives no technical training between Initial Entry Training and selection for SSG.

The selection for promotion and the scheduling of NCOES training is conducted centrally at the Army's Human Resources Directorate independent of the status of the unit to which the Soldier is assigned. Promotion most often results in a unit losing its NCO for three to six months regardless of major training events that are on the unit's training schedule. This can cause a significant burden to both the Soldier and the unit.

The Army recognizes the need to transform its current enlisted training model. The Army Training and Leadership Development Study, completed in 2002, identified glaring deficiencies in the NCO education system. It was found that the Army needed to perform a complete review of all of the skills and tasks trained at each NCOES course and realign them as appropriate:

The current NCOES does not adequately teach the conceptual and interpersonal skills NCOs require to operate in full spectrum operations in today's contemporary operational environment. The current NCOES is a rigid, task-based system. It is designed around the select-train-promote model with a one-size-fits-all approach to training NCOs. It does not account for the wide range of assignments or mission sets NCOs encounter today.⁴

The Army is currently reviewing its training programs, but is focused almost solely on the leadership and tactical tasks required for institutional training and not the technical military occupational specialty (MOS) skills required. The 2003 Army Modernization Plan recognizes the need to transform enlisted training holistically as it applies to the NCOES. The following statement reveals the main impetus for significant change: "As the Army evolves to meet full-spectrum operational requirements, expectations of the NCO corps will increase and the tasks normally associated with senior NCOs will migrate downward."⁵ It goes on to describe the significant changes in the NCOES system from the PLDC, through the BNCOC, to the ANCOC. The plan does not, however, address the need to similarly migrate downward the technical tasks that will be required of our future NCOs. In fact, although the trend is to move tactical tasks currently taught at higher levels to lower level training, there is not currently a similar initiative to move any technical training coincident with the PLDC. If not corrected, our future NCO corps may be tactically competent to lead and survive on the battlefield, but incapable of

performing the technical skills associated with their MOS in an increasingly complex and technically demanding environment. This highlights the need for senior leaders to completely reevaluate the NCOES and search for "out of the box" solutions.

The NCOES has not experienced a major overhaul in decades and the current training construct influences the proposed transformational changes. Since there has never been technical training associated with PLDC for our newly selected SGTs, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is not seriously looking at that as a possible initiative and solution to NCOES. In fact, the NCOES system itself has driven the way in which the Army branch proponent schools codify their essential technical skill and task requirements. Since there is no opportunity to provide technical training to sergeants (skill level 2), the schoolhouses are forced to code critical skills and tasks as skill level 1 (private through specialist level) or skill level 3 (staff sergeant level) and teach those requirements either in initial entry training or much later in BNCOC. In many cases this results in Soldier receiving certain technical training either too early or too late in their careers. TRADOC is struggling to create a training strategy that ensures that each Soldier receives the right training, at the right place, at the right time.

NO EVIDENCE OF FAILURE (NEOF) - A CASE STUDY IN TECHNICAL TRAINING

Although Army transformation provides impetus to reevaluate the Army's technical training model, there is evidence that the current training model would need revision even if transformation were not occurring. For years, the Army has been looking at the NCOES and contemplating how to best revise it within resource constraints. The Army Training and Leadership Development study of 2002 concluded that the Army's NCO education system needed a significant overhaul.⁶

To illustrate this, let's look at an issue with which the Army Ordnance Corps has been wrestling for some time. NEOF is a phenomenon that has plagued the Army for a number of years, and results in increased maintenance costs, increased transportation costs, and most importantly, decreased readiness. NEOF is defined as an event that occurs when a mechanic replaces a part or major assembly on a piece of Army equipment, and upon retrograde, inspection, and testing of that item, the part is found to be fully serviceable. That is, the original diagnosis by the mechanic was incorrect. This requires a rediagnosis of the piece of equipment, and most often, another repair part requisition cycle is required.

There have been numerous studies performed on NEOF between 1998 and 2003 which have had varied but similar and significant results. These studies, independently conducted by the Government Accounting Office, the Rand Corporation, the Army Materiel Systems Analysis

Activity, the Army Test and Evaluation Center and the Army Aviation and Missile Command, focused on varying types of Army equipment at different times, but all came up with a similar conclusion - the Army has a significant NEOF problem. The most telling study was carried out by AMSAA during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and focused on the M1 Abrams Tank and the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The study showed that from June to August of 2003, units operating in Iraq experienced a NEOF rate of over 40 percent.⁷ These studies indicate that, in addition to negatively effecting unit readiness, NEOF costs the Army over 45 million dollars each year in unnecessary maintenance and transportation costs.

In the mid-1980s, realizing there was a problem with the technical proficiency of its Soldiers, the Ordnance Corps conducted a limited trial pilot course at Aberdeen Proving Ground called "Master Diagnostician Course." This course was a proof of principle that explored additional training for the best and brightest NCOs to be unit level Master Diagnosticians. The course consisted of three weeks of highly specialized training in the area of advanced diagnostics, and was attended by NCOs that had been selected during their BNCOC based upon their class academic standings. The pilot course was a huge success based on NCO and unit commander feedback; however, the lack of sustained resources and support prevented its continuation beyond three classes. Recently, the Chief of Ordnance, BG Lenaers, highlighted the need for this type of additional technical training:

Considering the vastness of today's operating environment, it's evident that our maintenance assets have been, and will continue to be, widely dispersed across the area of operations. The dynamics of maintenance operations on the battlefield make it absolutely essential that equipment is fixed the first time and on-site. This idea of "first-time fix" cannot be achieved by having only one technical expert, the Warrant Officer, in a battalion. Warrant Officers are rarely the first to arrive at the equipment in need of repair; thus, each maintenance team must possess highly qualified technicians to have a significant impact on or be of any benefit to the maintenance mission.¹⁸

Clearly, the Ordnance Corps recognizes, as does the rest of the Army, that we are in need of an enhanced technical training strategy that includes the development of new and improved technical training programs. The Ordnance Corps has foreseen the requirements of the future battlefield, and has analyzed the current weaknesses in maintenance operations. In response, it has developed the Technician Program that addresses many of the technical weaknesses mechanics possess today and that has the potential to greatly improve future equipment readiness, training effectiveness, mechanic productivity, and that (promises to produce?) produces maintenance cost avoidance exceeding 44 million dollars annually.⁹

The Ordnance Corps has conducted an analysis that clearly illustrates the inefficiencies in the current maintenance training models and capabilities. In addition, Ordnance has conducted a detailed study of no evidence of failure (NEOF) rates and has shown the huge potential for high-dollar cost avoidance (savings) by reducing NEOF. Based on its analysis, the Ordnance Corps also is advocating the addition of a new technical training program to the NCOES. This program represents an entirely new training model by offering, for the first time, technical training to Army Ordnance SGTs, which it believes, should apply to all personnel and all MOSs as part of each Soldier's continuing education.¹⁰

The CSA's Logistics Transformation Task Force agreed with the conclusions of the Ordnance Corps and recommended the development of a "Technician" course program that would support logistics transformation through a more logical and efficient training model that emphasizes improved and advanced training in diagnostics, troubleshooting, and repair earlier in one's career.¹¹ Unfortunately, the Army has yet to resource such a program.

FORCE STABILIZATION

The problems with the current training model will be exacerbated as the Army transitions to Unit Manning and force stabilization. In one of GEN Schoomaker's 17 transformation focus areas, he describes the benefits of the force stabilization initiative as follows:

We think by stabilizing the Army, where we don't move the Army every two to three years on an individual basis, but we keep people in place, develop cohesive, stable units, where spouses can work, where kids can go to school, where people can invest in homes and develop equity, stabilizes forces. It's better for the fighting forces. It's better for the families. And, it will increase our retention.¹²

Under this policy, as Soldiers are assigned to a Unit of Action (UA) or a unit directly supporting a UA, they will be stabilized in that unit for three years with little or no opportunity for reassignment or to attend professional development training. Therefore, a NCO recently assigned to one of these units could be required to wait up to three years to attend resident institutional training and develop the requisite skills for his newly acquired rank. This is detrimental to both the NCO, who is now required to perform tasks for which he has not been trained, and to the unit, which will be saddled with a technically unqualified NCO.

There is no doubt that the Army is going in the right direction with this personnel assignment initiative. Army units have always suffered under the current manning process that creates a 30 to 40 percent turnover rate each year in all tactical units. This assignment system has led to serious problems with unit cohesion, collective proficiency, and overall unit readiness. The challenge the Army will have to face is how it can balance the need to stabilize Soldiers in

tactical units while at the same time ensuring that they have access to a professional development system that allows them to remain tactically and technically proficient.

MODULARITY

The Army is developing new organizations to meet the challenges of the 21st century operation: Units of Execution (UEs) X and Y, and UAs are stand-alone combined arms organizations. There are three types of UAs: heavy, light, and Stryker. UExs exercise command and control of Army forces at the tactical and operational-levels. Army components at the theater level are organized as UEys. In addition, specialized brigades may be assigned to both UExs and UEys when the situation requires their capabilities.¹³ Under CSA Gen. Peter Schoomaker's "modularity" focus area, the 33 maneuver brigades in today's active-component Army will be reset into 43 to 48 Brigade UAs. The new brigades will be smaller, but more lethal than current brigades and will include artillery and reconnaissance assets previously at the division level. Some corps assets will also move down to the brigades. The intent is to create a modular "brigade-based" Army that is more responsive to regional combatant commanders' needs.

Units of Action are the tactical warfighting echelons of the Objective Force...UAs comprise those echelons brigade and below. Maneuver UAs are the smallest combined arms units that can be committed independently. Their function is to finish decisively by closing with and destroying enemy forces through integrated fire and maneuver, and tactical assault. For continued developmental purposes, the core of the UA brigade is the combined arms combat battalion that commands a number of organic small tactical units, which fight as teams of fighting teams...Brigades are expected to employ most combat battalions in dispersed yet integrated engagements, while periodically cycling individual units into and out of contact to sustain operational momentum. Combat battalions must dominate the unexpected contact and be able to transition through several engagements in sequence.¹⁴

Modularity has had a tremendous effect on all types of tactical units, from combat arms, to combat support (CS), to combat service support (CSS). In an effort to make the UAs more self sufficient, many CS and CSS Soldiers have been moved forward to the brigade (BDE) level from the division and corps levels. This results in smaller densities of many technical MOSs in subordinate units of the UA without the benefit of sufficient senior and mid-grade NCOs to train and supervise these Soldiers in their MOS-specific technical skills. This puts a higher burden of technical mastery on more junior NCOs within the organization. The Army must find a way to relieve junior NCOs of this burden and develop an effective strategy to train them on the additional required technical skills earlier in their careers.

A good example of this phenomenon is the maintenance structure in the UAs. To provide greater self-sufficiency at the brigade level, the new modular designs have added welding capability, communications electronics (COMMEL) maintenance, missile maintenance, and special device repair capability to the maneuver units and base maintenance sections. The senior welder in this structure is a SGT and the senior COMMEL, special device, and missile mechanics in the unit are SSGs.¹⁵ This highlights the need for expert technical expertise at the lower NCO grades to ensure effective maintenance operations at the UA level.

DOCTRINE

The Objective Force represents a new way to train, organize, equip, and fight. Objective Force doctrine must reflect these revolutionary changes to the methods and procedures now required to effectively train, alert, deploy and employ. The doctrinal implications resulting from the establishment of the UA and UE cut across all battlefield functional areas and current branches, and must address the full spectrum of military operations.¹⁶

Future Force tactics will require maneuver sustainment leaders to operate more independently under increasingly more demanding conditions. Operational success will require that leaders exhibit mature judgment, be technically and tactically proficient, and above all, be adaptive. NCOs will require more technical skills earlier in their career development.¹⁷ The training and leader development process must extend from the institution to home-station to deployment, enabling maneuver sustainment leaders to gain, reinforce, advance, and accelerate the learning of essential battle command skills, when and where needed.¹⁸

As the Army transforms, so does the way in which it fights. The Army's new force structure and network-centric architecture allow it to fight in a vastly more dispersed and asymmetric way. No longer will the Army fight on a linear or contiguous battlefield. Units at the Brigade, Battalion, and even at the Company level and below, will find themselves operating at great distances from lateral units or higher headquarters. Junior NCOs and officers will find themselves isolated on the battlefield, operating and making decisions that could have operational or strategic consequence. They must be prepared for these eventualities, and the Army owes them the requisite training to succeed.

EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION

The Army's traditional acquisition approach to materiel development has proven to be incredibly slow and ineffective. The Secretary of Defense has put significant pressure on the Department of Defense to streamline, accelerate, and otherwise become more efficient in its acquisition processes. The Army, under General Schoomaker, has fully embraced this

philosophy and embarked on an ambitious and fast-paced modernization program. Due to the Global War on Terror, the Army is taking advantage of a funding stream, unprecedented since the end of the Cold War, as an opportunity to engage modernization on multiple fronts. The Army Chief of Staff has successfully tied modernization and reorganization of the current legacy force and its systems to deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. As current divisions prepare for rotations to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or OIF, they are converting to the UA/UEX structure. The Army must include in this initiative, an effective training program to ensure technical proficiency on modernized and new equipment.

In addition to reorganizing units, the Army is fielding with them the most modern equipment the Army has to offer and providing relevant weapon system and equipment upgrades - Blue Force Tracker, new generation night vision devices, and embedded diagnostics just to name a few. At the same time, Stryker units are being fielded at a measured pace of nearly one a year through FY 09, and the FCS, although delayed slightly, is still on track for initial fielding in FY14. All three of these modernization paths share one thing in common – the incorporation of a spiral development concept that adds new technologies and capabilities to each unit as it prepares for an operational deployment.

This systematic approach is revolutionary in the modernization of Army formations and equipment, but it creates a significant challenge in ensuring the technical competence of the Soldiers manning and sustaining them. Each time a Soldier is reassigned to a UA, whether an operator or a maintainer, he will find a substantially different set of equipment. The Army must develop a training strategy to ensure that these Soldiers are fully trained technically. This will ensure they can get the most tactically out of the equipment as well as maintain and support it effectively.

The Army's new STRYKER Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) provides an example of the systematic insertion of new technologies into the Army force structure. Stood up just 18 months ago, the first SBCT has deployed to Afghanistan in support of OEF. Due to the leading edge technologies embedded in the Army's first modular design, the STRYKER combat vehicle requires over 120 specialized contractors to maintain its highly complex systems.¹⁹ In order to reduce future over-reliance on contractors in future SBCTs as well as in future force BDEs, the Army must provide more technically proficient NCOs at the BDE level.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On the importance of training, General Schoomaker writes, "Just as training must reflect the hard certainties of the conflict before us, individual Soldier and leader education must

address its uncertainties. George C. Marshall once said that an Army at peace must go to school. Our challenge is to go to school while at war.¹²⁰ In 2002, the CSA directed the establishment of the Warrior Ethos task force, which studied problems associated with Soldiers' relative lack of tactical skills and values. The findings of that study provided the impetus for many of the changes that the Army NCOES is experiencing today. The NCOES changes have certainly been driven by the transformational effects on all aspects of the Army's DOTMLPF, however, they are focused mainly on tactical competence and not on increasing the technical expertise of our Soldiers today, or as we transform to the future force.

Following are recommendations that the Army should consider and implement to ensure that our NCOs continue to receive the right training at the right time and remain both tactically competent and technically proficient as part of our future force.

TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR SERGEANTS

The Army should develop, where appropriate, a technical training course for Sergeants in most of its technical MOSs. It must provide the opportunity for all TRADOC branch schoolhouses to offer a technical training component in conjunction with PLDC. This will bridge the technical training gap that currently exists between initial entry training and BNCOC.

Currently, based on the traditional NCOES, Soldiers receive their rudimentary technical training as part of initial entry training, immediately following BCT. The next time they receive technical training is in conjunction with BNCOC, at approximately the six to seven year mark in a Soldier's career. This technical "training gap" is unacceptable, especially considering the incredible pace of materiel modernization and technology insertion associated with Army transformation.

EMBEDDED TECHNICAL TRAINING

As the Army develops the future variants of the STRYKER platform and the FCSt needs to incorporate not only embedded operator and collective training, but maintenance training as well. Embedded training capability would reduce or in some cases negate the requirement to send these Soldiers back to a resident institutional training course. This would enhance Soldier technical proficiency while allowing for force stabilization and unit manning initiatives to be better met.

Embedded training is a requirement that has been placed in the Operations and Organization plans for both of these systems; however, only limited embedded training capability has emerged in the STRYKER system to date. Historically, when materiel development programs begin to go over budget, requirements for training packages, training

simulations, and training equipment are some of the first things to go unfulfilled. The Army must hold the materiel developers' and supporting contractors' feet to the fire to ensure that these future requirements are fully realized.

FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING MANAGEMENT

The Army must become flexible enough in its assignment process to anticipate when a Soldier should attend additional NCOES training. This resident training must be offered between assignments to insure that future promotions do not saddle a unit with an unqualified NCO. In some cases, this might require sending Soldiers to training before they are selected to the next rank, but it will ensure that they are tactically and technically proficient throughout their assignments.

In addition to better anticipation and scheduling of NCOES, the Army must add more resolution to Soldiers' training records. With the spiral development of future combat systems, it is essential that the Army track, in detail, what systems and technologies each Soldier has received training for and has experience working with. This will allow the Army to accurately identify what technical training the Soldier might or might not need based on prior training or prior operational experience.

LIFELONG LEARNING

The Army defines Lifelong Learning as "The ability of a Soldier to learn, grow and achieve technically and tactically throughout a career, wherever they serve."²¹ Lifelong Learning begins with recruiter contact and progresses until retirement. The Army needs to fully embrace and resource its Lifelong Learning initiatives to help ensure that all Soldiers receive the right technical training at the right place and time. It can be provided in a number of methods, to include resident training, distance learning, embedded training, delivered training, and TRADOC provided interactive digital lesson plans.

This Lifelong Learning approach, which was adopted by the Army Senior Leaders Conference at the AUSA in January 2002, emphasizes four enablers:

1. Web-delivered simulations. A form of "learning by doing" that allows Soldiers to acquire and practice skills in interactive 3D simulations that can run stand-alone on standard personal computers. Units in garrison or in the field in Iraq, Korea, and Europe can use these simulations for sustainment training and new personnel training.
2. Resource centers. These will provide reach back capability for Soldiers worldwide on a 24-hour, 7 days a week, 365 days a year basis. They enable access to subject matter experts

from each of the Army schoolhouses and can present the most up-to-date tactical and technical information as well as emerging lessons learned from ongoing operations.

3. Assignment oriented training (AOT). AOT is a tailored approach to technical training. It allows each of the schoolhouses to focus the training they provide to each individual student based on the Soldiers' next assignment.

4. Virtual campuses. Similar to today's on-line universities, virtual campuses could reduce the amount of resident training Soldiers require by providing courses on-line to Soldiers' worldwide. The Army would be able to alert Soldiers when a new course is available and track the progress and completion of each of the course requirements.²²

This initiative has been on-going since 2002, but thus far the Army has failed to fund it sufficiently. The Army must make this a high priority if we are to ensure that our Soldiers remain technically proficient throughout this fast paced transformation process.

The Army is currently transforming at a breakneck pace to ensure it remains relevant and ready to meet the future threats and challenges of the new century. These monumental changes cut across the DOTMLPF. Quality training has and will always be a vital component of the Army's success. As the Soldier remains the centerpiece of the Army's formations, the Army must transform its training strategy to ensure that each Soldier is both tactically and technically proficient. It must ensure it puts as much effort and resources into training transformation as it does in the other elements of the DOTMLPF.

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¹⁰ Ibid.

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